"Nature" is the historical millstone hung round the necks of women. It is not the only such stone, but it has been the heaviest and the most securely tied. If we understand feminism to be first a social movement for the emancipation of women, then we recognize that the question of nature has been the central question for feminism because the question of nature is the question of freedom for women.
engagements with it. And while simplicity, my reader will assent, has its virtues, it also has its vices. My formulation affirms that there is a problem between feminists and nature (no surprise there), but also implies that nature is the sort of thing that some set of subjects called feminists can do something about, maybe even must do something about. Not only that, but already I am slipping between "nature" in scare quotes and nature standing on its own, from a figure constituted by human minds, hands, institutions, to one that is not reducible to and maybe even only has meaning as distinct from or excessive to human making. It may not please my reader to find that I am determined to continue this sloppy thinking. I will only defend myself here by promising to consider the source of such sloppiness throughout the essay, and by pointing once again to that millstone round our necks. It is a flattened, round stone and has a hole in the center with a chain through it, evidence enough that we are not talking about nature but about "nature," yet it is, after all, a stone. One can imagine that it lay innocently and naturally enough in a meadow or a forest somewhere at some point, its weight quite indifferent to the one who found it and lay claim to it, but who needed precisely that indifferent weight to grind grain and feed himself.
The millstone is, then, evidence not only of historical injustice, but of what Marx, and Arendt following Marx, designated significantly as "our metabolism with the earth." If we are to live at all we have to work on a nature that persistently exceeds, escapes, and resists human making, and unless we are able and willing to do this work or have some other creature, human or beast, we can pay, force or cajole into doing it for us, we sink back into the matter of the earth and feed something else (whether microbe, worm or Service Corporation, Inc.
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Needless to say, this is a problem that women and men share, and share with every other living thing on the planet. We are ontologically entangled with grain and stone. The notorious ambiguity of the human condition that the existentialists so insisted we pay attention to results from this; we are part of and dependent on a nature that seems to be a vast system of indifferent processes, and yet we must think and act, i.e. deploy our freedom, in relation to it.
Feminists, including this one, have two problems with nature then: a special problem which is a historical and political problem (the millstone round our necks), and an ontological problem that we share with everyone else (our metabolism with the earth). My claim is that the first problem is so acute that it tends to make us forget the second. This results in the persistent ghettoization of feminist thinking about nature around the question of sexual difference. Yet, I contend, we can only make sense of the continued efficacy of egregious associations between women and nature if we understand the political problem by means of the ontological problem, i.e. if the problem of sexual difference opens out onto the problem of nature more broadly.
The existentialists, who some are prone to dismiss today as having counted on an overinflated notion of human freedom rooted in Cartesian ontology, were nonetheless the ones who noticed so consistently that humans have a very hard time coming to terms with the fundamental paradox of the human condition, with being nature and yet being the kinds of creatures who experience ourselves at a certain distance from nature. Women aren't, perhaps, as much better at this than men as we once hoped. Beauvoir's account is the classic one: Our ontological condition mandates that we do something about nature because we are irretrievably part of it and irrevocably in need of it, yet not completely immersed in it.
For women this mandate is at least double, 3 because dominant traditions in the west have consistently tried to overcome the ambiguity of the human relation to nature by making women the natural part of humanity and men the bearers of consciousness and culture. To repeat myself, the trouble feminists have with nature is both specific to women and not specific to women, and we haven't been very good at sorting this out, for some very good reasons.
The identification of women with nature, often in the same breath that the human is distinguished from nature, and an obsessive fascination with natural sexual difference which we inherit like a bad debt, are at the heart of the specific cultural legacy that women carry in the tradition of western philosophy. The need to justify injustice, to provide an alibi for egregious social hierarchies that organize the parasitic appropriation of women's labor, both reproductive and productive, by men, has been so entangled with efforts to describe what natural sexual difference is, that any attempt to address these differences is inescapably burdened by that history, i.e., it carries with it, to speak like Virginia Woolf for a moment, a certain odor of injustice (Woolf 1938, 50-53) . This odor fills the room whenever anyone speaks of sexual difference as natural difference, or originary difference (which seems always to reduce to the same thing), or essential difference (which seems always to reduce to the same thing), and it carries that odor even when the speaker is herself feminist.
If the fundamental division in contemporary feminist thinking can be described as that between feminists who are interested in deconstructing, all the way down, the notion of natural differences between women and men as pre-social, as grounding the social, and feminists who are interested in recuperating, re-affirming or asserting some version of originary sexual the paradox of the human condition on the one hand, and the tension between our political inheritance of an egregious association between women and nature and our impulse to affirm "the feminine" as an originary source of meaning and value on the other. Contemporary efforts to address the problem are encouraging, though still only in their incipient moment, and still struggling with a tendency to collapse one term into the other, i.e. nature into culture (making everything a question of politics), or culture into nature (where everything is staked on getting our account of nature right, making politics a mere matter of correcting nasty epistemological mistakes).
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The Legacy and its Contemporary Manifestations I want to start by spending a little time thinking about what I've just called our political inheritance of an egregious association between women and nature, even though the topic is so wellstudied at this point, it may seem unnecessary. If we are to understand the intensity of the feminist commitment to a deconstruction of this association, however, it is important that we refresh our memories, while at the same time reminding ourselves that the entanglements of woman/nature that feminists find troublesome are as much a part of our contemporary thinking as they were in the most robust moments of what we call modernity.
In his 1762 treatise on education, Emile, Rousseau reserves his last chapter for the as yet neglected topic of the proper education of women. His basic theory is that the natural differences between women and men must be recognized as having moral force.
This conclusion is evident to the senses; it is in agreement with our experience;
and it shows how vain are the disputes as to whether one of the two sexes is superior or whether they are equal-as though each, in fulfilling nature's ends according to its own particular purpose, were thereby less perfect than if it resembled the other more. In what they have in common, they are equal.
Where they differ, they are not comparable…In the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same way…one ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak…Once this principle is established it follows that woman is made specially to please man. If man ought to please her in turn, it is due to a less direct necessity. His merit is in his power; he pleases by the sole fact of his strength. This is not the law of love, I
agree. But it is that of nature, prior to love itself. The authors of this book explain not only rape, but sexual difference itself 6 , why women suffer psychological trauma from rape; demographic patterns in rape, why rape occurs more often in war, why husbands don't believe their wives when they say they've been raped, and why women lie about being raped; all as ultimately caused by evolutionary processes of genetic selection.
Having lost God as the source of both nature and those aspects of human character that Cultural explanations for male sexual aggression fail because they fail to understand that culture, too, is nature, a complex set of adaptations; which is to say that culture is also biology.
Social scientists fail to learn from the biological sciences in their evolutionary, endocrinological, or neuro-biological manifestations, because they, not the biological scientists, are prone to the naturalistic fallacy of Rousseau and Kant, assuming that if something exists naturally, then it also provides a kind of moral prescription for human behavior. Arendt tells us that the only place in contemporary life where we retain this notion of a founding and the authority that emerges from it is in our conception of revolution (136). In other words, radical political upheaval seems to need this notion of a founding as a reference point in the past, even if the very recent past, which serves as a kind of stabilizing touchstone in the present and a guide into the future. Soper talks about the "inaugural moment" of contemporary feminism as having precisely that kind of authoritative force, the authoritative force of a new and almost sacred beginning. Insofar as feminism constitutes a radical political and conceptual upheaval, and that conceptual upheaval is rooted in a founding moment which denaturalizes and historicizes nature, then it will be legitimate to speak of this inaugural move of feminism as having authoritative force.
Of course, and Arendt is aware of this, the notion of a "founding" is in no way a frozen notion and the practice of an appeal to a "founding" is in no way a frozen practice. We are constantly in the process of identifying and interpreting the founding moment (a process which is by no means innocent of material interests), of negotiating appeals to that moment, of renewing the founding, we might say, or of relevancing the founding in the context of our contemporary concerns. When Soper appeals to the inaugural moment of feminism and characterizes that appeal, she is claiming relevance and authority for a certain interpretation of the founding. And in the face of contemporary work like that of Thornhill and Palmer, there is no reason to suggest that this authoritative force should not be maintained.
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If we are to identify the founding moment for contemporary feminism in the west, there are various contested ways to do that, but in philosophy a clear candidate for the title of Fr. vol. 2, 13). 10 Beauvoir insists that the work of "legislators, priests, philosophers, writers, and scientists" "conceals a desire for self-justification" (Eng. xxviii-xxix; Fr. Vol. 1, 25) under the guise of nature. She devotes an entire chapter to the search for a justification of the oppression of women in biology, considering the evidence that is presented in the science of her time, she notes that "It would be foolhardy indeed to deduce from such evidence that woman's place is in the home-but there are foolhardy men" (Eng. 13; Fr. vol. 1, 49), and she goes on to name several. At the end of the chapter she makes clear that she considers the facts or "givens" of biology "insufficient for setting up a hierarchy of the sexes; they fail to explain why woman is the Other; they do not condemn her to remain in this subordinate role forever" (Eng. 32-33; Fr. vol. I, 73). "All these dissertations," she notes, "which mingle a vague naturalism with a still more vague ethics or aesthetics are pure verbiage… man is not a natural species: he is a historical idea. Woman is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming…when we have to do with a being whose nature is transcendent action, we can never close the books" (Eng. On the other hand, those French feminists who claim that sexual difference is itself an effect of social power have also claimed Beauvoir. Significantly, these radically constructivist accounts do not rely, as they do initially in English speaking contexts, on a distinction between sex and gender. In English-speaking contexts, there is still a tendency to ritualistically credit Beauvoir with inventing the distinction between sex and gender that became so significant in AngloAmerican feminist's constructivist accounts of "gender difference," even after much dispute of this point by francophone feminist critics.
Elsewhere, however, Beauvoir herself has been interpreted differently. One strand of Beauvoir criticism claims that she is herself an essentialist, who firmly roots the oppression of women in female bodily differences from men. 11 Women's reproductive capacities and bodily morphology entail a distinct relation to the species, to time and to space, which are at the heart of women's Otherness from men. This is a biology that is pre-social and heavy-handedly determinative of existential possibilities. These critics point out that for Beauvoir, it is only by transcending the realm of female biology (and this transcendence is a newly emergent historical possibility), that women can escape enslavement to the species and enjoy the freedom that men reach more naturally. Here "transcendence" is read as an absolute overcoming or leaving behind of the distinct femaleness of a woman's body that bespeaks a deep devaluation of what is overcome. 12 Beauvoir's notorious warnings about motherhood and childrearing are read as mandating that women eschew these natural capacities in favor of transcendent (on this interpretation masculine) action. Beauvoir must devalue female biology because she sees it as so negatively determinative of female possibilities.
These disparate readings of Beauvoir are, as other critics have noted, symptomatic of the very problem she is so careful to spell out even in her early work. In other words, the paradox of immanence and transcendence can neither be eluded nor resolved, it must be suffered. 13 Beauvoir's work is subject to opposing misinterpretations because our tendency is to want to flee the paradox rather than endure it. Beauvoir's insistence on the irresolvability of our ambiguous relation with nature is unnerving because she affirms that nature is the necessary ground of, indifferent to, excessive of and significant in human endeavors all at the same time. She seems to contradict herself from sentence to sentence because she keeps moving between the two poles of the paradox.
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Beauvoir gives an account of a relation between "woman" and "nature" that is not causal in the usual sense. In fact, her seemingly contradictory statements about nature begin to unravel the structure of causality that is the skeletal base on which debates about sexual difference, and so much else, usually hang. In patriarchal accounts nature causes social power differences between men and women. In feminist "denaturalizing" accounts, material and political interests or discursive formations act causally on material bodies to constrain, shape or constitute them as sexed. In feminist "renaturalizing" accounts women's bodily differences are backgrounded causes for symbolic formations that are potentially generative of powerful positive meanings for sexual difference. In Beauvoir's phenomenological description of what it means to be a woman, on the other hand, the very force and directionality of causality is not eliminated but diffracted;
we are no longer dealing with linear causal chains but with entanglements.
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Perhaps the best example to illustrate this point is Beauvoir's continual return to the theme of temporality in her descriptions of women's situation. Even as she dismisses efforts to explain women's social situation by reference to biology, as if biological sexual differences directly cause social hierarchies, and even as she refutes the scientists' pet idea that there is an essential passivity in the biology of the female complemented by an essential activity in the biology of the male, Beauvoir herself takes note of a temporal feature of mammalian biological existence that she finds significant in giving an account of social hierarchies between women and Of course neither pregnancy nor breast feeding are universal features of female existence, but the capacity for these is limited, at present, to (some/most) humans who are female, and to an extended but limited period of their lives. Perhaps more significantly, becoming a distinct being in and coming into the world through a female body is, at present, a universal feature of human existence. Having had one's life maintained, in its earliest moments, by a female body, is a history every human shares. Precisely here, in this most indisputably natural place, at the split between the faces of time Beauvoir described, at the scission that is natural sexual difference, a nature that is irreducible to and excessive to human making (we neither choose nor design this path into the world) is intricately intertwined with and marked by humanly instituted processes.
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While this is, perhaps, an overly literal example, it serves to wake us up to the process of entangling at the shifting, messy, blurred demarcation between nature and culture.
Beauvoir's method pushes us to notice these entanglements, to begin to sort them out without allowing ourselves to reduce one side to the other, to either deny the significance of the natural or to sink comfortably into the succor of a determinatively causal account of our relation to it.
At one founding moment of contemporary feminist thinking, then, deconstructive and descriptive engagements with the question of nature, far from being opposed, are co-necessary features of feminist thought.
What bothers me about the splitting of feminism between the champions of originary sexual difference and the critics of sexual difference, is that this seems to represent feminism's version of the common human unwillingness or incapacity to endure the ambiguity of the Vol. I, 25), are the political forms that feed on the existential condition. In order to even ask the question of sexual difference one had to ask questions about the finite and the infinite, the cyclical and the narrative, our metabolism with the earth and our capacity to extend ourselves into spaces that exceed that metabolism.
The question of sexual difference, for Beauvoir, opened out onto the complex tension and relation between humans and nature. This constituted a radical upheaval precisely because the use of "nature" as justification for women's oppression historically and today, fastens on and becomes obsessed with questions of natural sexual difference, and diverts all attention away from the common human condition that defines our relation to nature. When feminists are unwilling or unable to endure the ambiguity of the human condition, to suffer that ambiguity, we tend to fasten on and become obsessed with the very same question, and we radically reduce our field of engagement with the question of nature. We implicitly accept our confinement within the boundaries of natural sexual difference, whether as the object of our enthusiasm or the object of our criticism.
Conclusion
At a time like the one we are living in, when strange and short-sighted ways of structuring our metabolism with the earth have brought us to a new point of crisis in that relation, we can ill afford such a reduced field of engagement. Soper's claim, that "the inaugural move of feminism, in fact, was the challenge it delivered to the presumed 'naturality' of male supremacy," that "Feminism… gets off the ground through a deconstructive move whose effect is to expose the discursive … function of 'nature' in endowing with the seal of necessity what in reality is a matter of convention" (Soper 1995, 121), is not wrong, but it is incomplete. A reconsideration of just this one inaugural event of feminism, reveals that it cannot be adequately characterized only by attending to its deconstructive side. Beauvoir exposes both the justificatory appeal to nature and the entanglement of power with nature, how power feeds on nature, and how we live in necessary tension with nature… and this nature is not merely a discursive effect.
The question of nature is so central to feminist thought because feminist thinking is the thinking of a social movement that aims at removing the millstone tied round women's necks.
This puts feminists in a tense relation to the natural. Beauvoir's genius was to think this historical tension along with the ontological tension that it feeds on, to broaden the question of sexual difference into the question of nature as a central aspect of the human condition.
Feminists need to return to this founding moment, and try to grasp it in its complexity, to endure the ambiguity, if we are to work our way through the contemporary divide in feminism over the question of sexual difference, and to address the question of nature in a way that is more fully relevant to the challenges facing all of us in our contemporary world.
1 The world's largest funeral home chain.
2 Beauvoir wrote, even in The Second Sex, with "generic" masculine pronouns. I've taken the liberty of changing those here, since stylistic conventions have changed, and since Beauvoir clearly meant this passage to refer to all humans. 3 For many or most women this mandate might be better described as "triple" since colonizers habitually locate colonized peoples, women and men, in the realm of nature, as well as locating women of their own nation or race in that sphere. The literature is full of direct comparisons (see references to these in Kaplan and Rogers, Gene Worship, 2003, pp. 32-36). 4 Let's not forget that the very inauguration of the symbolic for both Levi-Strauss and Freud was founded in the exchange of women by men, women being the natural resource that enabled men to turn human life from nature to culture, from things to representations, from biology to language. Women are the transition, for men, from natural object to symbol. Albeit in a circular way, arguing that sex differences are attributable to "the simple fact that males and females in ancestral populations faced very different obstacles to reproduction" (2000, 31) which amounts to saying "sex differences are attributable to sex differences," since sex differences have already been defined as a division of labor in reproduction. While she equates sex with an animal function of brutal reality, she defines female physiology in terms of inertia, passivity… In these horrifying passages, which inform more on the neuroses of their author than on a presumed feminine essence, nature is identified with woman who is, in turn, identified with the disgust generated by her sexual organs"(Léon 1995, 143-144). Chanter says that Beauvoir "ascribes a purely negative connotation to the ways in which women differ from men" (Chanter 1995, 49-50).
12 How "transcendence" should be understood in Beauvoir's work is a point of contention. Most Beauvoir scholars working out of a phenomenological tradition reject this reading of "transcendence" as insufficiently rooted in the philosophical tradition in which Beauvoir was trained and insufficiently attentive to nuances in Beauvoir's own work.
